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I. INTRODUCTION 
When a court announces a new rule of constitutional criminal 
procedure, one question immediately follows: does the new rule 
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apply to litigants negatively affected by the “old rule?”1  For the past 
two hundred years, the answer to this question was simple and 
straightforward—yes.2  In 1965, however, the U.S. Supreme Court 
abandoned the traditional analysis and adopted a case-by-case 
approach for determining the retroactivity3 of new rules of 
constitutional criminal procedure.4  In the 1989 case of Teague v. 
Lane, the Court revisited the doctrine of retroactivity and 
announced that new rules of constitutional criminal procedure 
would, as a general rule, not apply retroactively.5
Although the Teague rule was specifically designed for, and 
limited to, cases on federal habeas review, a few states, including 
Minnesota, incorrectly interpreted Teague as binding on state 
courts in state post-conviction proceedings.
  
6
 
 1. See Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane 
on State Postconviction Remedies, 44 ALA. L. REV. 421, 421–22 (1993) (discussing the 
implications of new rules).  “The question of retroactivity is what to do when the 
law changes.  More precisely, it is to whom the new law should be applied, and to 
whom the old.”  Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth 
of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1999).  See generally 21 
C.J.S. Courts § 204 (2009) (providing a brief overview of the American retroactivity 
doctrine); S. R. Shapiro, Annotation, Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Overruling 
Decision, 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 (1966) (providing a detailed overview of the American 
retroactivity doctrine in both criminal and civil applications). 
  In 2006, Stephen 
 2. Matthew R. Doherty, Note, The Reluctance Towards Retroactivity: The 
Retroactive Application of Laws in Death Penalty Collateral Review Cases, 39 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 445, 450–52 (2004) (discussing the common law approach to retroactivity). 
 3. “A decision is retro[active] if it applies to causes of action accruing before 
the decision.” 21 C.J.S. Courts § 204 (2009).  
A ruling that does not apply even to the parties before the court in the 
case in which the ruling is issued is purely prospective.  A decision has 
limited prospective effect if the rule announced applies retroactively to 
the parties before the court and also to those litigants whose claims were 
pending at the time of the decision announcing the new rule, but 
prospectively to all others.   
Id.(footnotes omitted).  For a detailed discussion of relevant definitions, 
specifically in the context of criminal procedure, see State v. Baird, 654 N.W.2d 
105, 111 n.5 (Minn. 2002). 
 4. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965). 
 5. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). 
 6. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1042 n.17 (2008).  As Justice 
Stevens emphasized in Danforth, Teague was decided under the federal habeas 
statute and, therefore, is not binding on state courts.  Id. 
It is . . . abundantly clear that the Teague rule of nonretroactivity was 
fashioned to achieve the goals of federal habeas while minimizing federal 
intrusion into state criminal proceedings.  It was intended to limit the 
authority of federal courts to overturn state convictions—not to limit a 
state court’s authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of 
constitutional law when reviewing its own State’s convictions.   
2
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Danforth, seeking post-conviction relief, urged the Minnesota 
Supreme Court to abandon the Teague test and adopt an alternative 
approach.7  The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Danforth’s 
argument, holding that it was required to follow Teague’s 
retroactivity standard.8  The U.S. Supreme Court sided with 
Danforth and reversed and remanded, holding that states were free 
to develop their own retroactivity approaches for state post-
conviction proceedings.9  On remand, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court again rejected Danforth’s arguments and decided to retain 
the Teague retroactivity approach for state post-conviction 
proceedings.10  Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided to 
formally adopt a retroactivity standard that was not designed for 
state post-conviction application.11
This note first traces the history of the federal retroactivity 
doctrine, from the English common law to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s latest decision in Danforth.
   
12  Next, this note discusses the 
history and development of the retroactivity doctrine in the State of 
Minnesota.13  Then, this note discusses the facts and holding14 and 
provides an analysis of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s final 
decision in Danforth v. State.15  This note goes on to suggest that the 
Minnesota Supreme Court should accept the Supreme Court’s 
invitation to develop a retroactivity standard that is responsive to 
the goals and purpose of Minnesota’s post-conviction proceedings16 
and provides a number of alternatives that can be adopted in 
Teague’s place.17  Finally, this note concludes that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court should adopt a modified, broader version of the 
Teague retroactivity standard because it will best serve the goals and 
purpose of state post-conviction review.18
 
Id. at 1041. The Court also noted that following Teague, the majority of state courts 
interpreted Teague as binding only on federal habeas courts.  Id. at 1042.  
Minnesota is one of only three states that interpreted Teague as binding on state 
courts.  Id. n.17. 
   
 7. Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 2009). 
 8. Id. at 494. 
 9. Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1041–42. 
 10. Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 494. 
 11. See Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1041. 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See infra Part IV.A. 
 17. See infra Part IV.B. 
 18. See infra Parts IV.C and V. 
3
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II. HISTORY 
A. Development and History of the Federal Retroactivity Doctrine 
1. Retroactivity at Common Law 
The origins of retroactivity and its basic principles can be 
traced back to the English common law.19  Under common law, 
newly announced rules were applied retroactively to all subsequent 
cases, without distinguishing between cases on direct and collateral 
review.20  As Professor LaFave points out in his treatise, “At 
common law there was no authority supporting the proposition 
that judicial decisions made law only for the future.”21
The common law approach to retroactivity was based on 
Blackstone’s declaratory theory of law,
  
22 stating that “the duty of 
the court was not to ‘pronounce a new law, but to maintain and 
expound the old one.’”23  Under this approach, the judge does not 
create new law, but rather “discover[s] what the true law is and . . . 
expose[s] the misinterpretation that formerly governed.”24  
Because courts did not create the law but merely discovered it, a 
court’s overruling of a prior decision was simply viewed as a 
correction of a prior misunderstanding of the law.25  Accordingly, 
the overruled decision was never the law, and the newly announced 
rule, having been the law all along, must be applied retroactively.26
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted this approach,
  
27
 
 19. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 (1965).  The Linkletter Court 
began its analysis by reviewing the history of retroactivity, noting that “[w]hile to 
some it may seem ‘academic’ it might be helpful to others . . . .”  Id. 
 and, until 
 20. Doherty, supra note 2, at 450 (discussing retroactivity at common law); see 
also Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 622 (“At common law there was no authority for the 
proposition that judicial decisions made law only for the future.”); Kuhn v. 
Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Judicial 
decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years.”). 
 21. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 11.5 (4th ed. 2008). 
 22. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623 n.7 (“While Blackstone is always cited as the 
foremost exponent of the declaratory theory, a very similar view was stated by Sir 
Matthew Hale in his History of the Common Law which was published 13 years 
before the birth of Blackstone.”). 
 23. Id. at 622–23 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69 (15th ed. 1809)). 
 24. Hutton, supra note 1, at 425 (discussing Blackstone’s theory of law). 
 25. See id. (discussing Blackstone’s theory of law). 
 26. See id. (“In accordance with this theory, any ‘new rule’ has to be applied 
retroactively because it represents what the law has been all along.”). 
 27. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1036 (2008) (“[U]ntil 1965 
4
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1965, new rules of constitutional criminal procedure were 
consistently applied to all cases coming before the Court on habeas 
review.28  As one commentator noted, “[t]here was no question of 
which laws should be retroactive, or whom they would be 
retroactive to, because the law was always applied retroactively.”29  
In his article attacking the Linkletter decision, Professor James 
Haddad correctly pointed out that prior to 1965, “the Court’s 
practice always had been to apply new constitutional decisions 
retroactively and never did a majority opinion even consider that 
something less would be permissible.”30  Even the Linkletter court 
admitted that “[i]t is true that heretofore, without discussion, we 
have applied new constitutional rules to cases finalized before the 
promulgation of the [new] rule.”31  As such, the common law 
approach to retroactivity was relatively straight-forward and 
provided courts with a bright-line, easily applicable rule of 
automatic retroactivity.32
By 1965, however, the legal realism movement, based on John 
Austin’s theory of law,
 
33
 
the Court continued to construe every constitutional error, including newly 
announced ones, as entitling state prisoners to relief on federal habeas.”); 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 (1965). (“The Blackstonian view ruled 
English jurisprudence and cast its shadow over our own . . . .”). 
 had emerged and was gaining popularity 
 28. Danforth, 128 S. Ct. at 1036 (Until 1965, “‘[n]ew’ constitutional rules of 
criminal procedure were, without discussion or analysis, routinely applied to cases 
on habeas review.”); see also LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 11.5 (“This common law 
position took hold in this country, so that it was generally assumed that all judicial 
decisions were fully retroactive.”); Ann N. Bosse, Retroactivity and the Supreme Court, 
41 MD. B.J. 30, 30 (2008) (“Until . . . 1965, new rules of criminal procedure were 
routinely applied to all cases - past, present, and to come.”). 
 29. Doherty, supra note 2, at 451 (discussing retroactivity at common law). 
 30. James B. Haddad, “Retroactivity Should Be Rethought”: A Call for the End of 
the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 417, 425 (1969).  
 31. Linkletter 381 U.S. at 628.  Prior to 1965, “the thought that a decision of 
the United States Supreme Court declarative of constitutional rights might be 
nonretroactive was never seriously entertained.”  LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 11.5. 
 32. See Doherty, supra note 2, at 451 (discussing retroactivity at common law).  
At common law, “questions of retroactivity were easy, indeed, invisible.” Roosevelt, 
supra note 1, at 1077–78 (discussing retroactivity at common law).  As some 
commentators argue, the Court’s rejection of the common law automatic 
retroactivity doctrine during the last half of the twentieth century has created 
confusion and inconsistency.  See Christopher S. Strauss, Comment, Collateral 
Damage: How the Supreme Court’s Retroactivity Doctrine Affects Federal Drug Prisoners’ 
Apprendi Claims on Collateral Review, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1220, 1222 (2003) (discussing 
the Court’s current retroactivity doctrine and stating that over the past thirty-six 
years, the Court has been struggling with a retroactivity doctrine that is 
“theoretically incoherent” and “difficult to apply”). 
 33. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 624 (discussing Austin’s theory of law); see also 
5
Leyderman: Criminal Law: Minnesota Formally Adopts the Teague Retroactivity
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
12. Leyderman.doc 12/2/2009  4:46 PM 
302 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1 
among scholars and practitioners.34  Austin argued that “judges do 
in fact do something more than discover law; they make it 
interstitially by filling in with judicial interpretation the vague, 
indefinite, or generic statutory or common-law terms that alone are 
but the empty crevices of the law.”35  Under this theory, overruled 
decisions are considered valid law until overruled, and newly 
announced rules of law do not apply retroactively to decisions 
made final prior to the announcement of the new rule.36
Relying on the theory of legal realism, some scholars 
challenged the common law approach to retroactivity.
  
37  Critics 
argued that the common law approach was “out of tune with 
actuality” because judicial repeal of what was thought to be the law 
could often “work hardship to those who had trusted to its 
existence.” 38  As for the members of the Court, Justice Frankfurter 
was the first to suggest, in 1956, that new rules of constitutional 
criminal procedure should not be applied retroactively.39  
Concurring in Griffin v. Illinois,40 Justice Frankfurter argued that 
the “law generally speaks prospectively. . . . We should not indulge 
in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the 
law . . . . It is much more conducive to law’s self-respect to 
recognize candidly the considerations that give prospective content 
to a new pronouncement of law.”41  Similarly, in 1958, Justices 
Harlan and Whittaker renewed Justice Frankfurter’s proposal and 
urged the Court to adopt a prospective-only application of the rule 
announced in Griffin.42  In Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison 
Terms and Paroles,43 Justices Harlan and Whittaker argued that 
Griffin, decided in 1956, should not be applied retroactively to a 
defendant convicted in 1935.44
 
Charles Leonard Scalise, A Clear Break from the Clear Break Exception of Retroactivity 
Analysis: Griffith v. Kentucky, 73 IOWA L. REV. 473, 476-77 (1988) (discussing 
Austin’s theory of law and its gaining popularity).  
  
 34. See Doherty, supra note 2, at 451 (discussing retroactivity at common law). 
See also Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 624 (discussing cases applying Austin’s theory of legal 
realism). 
 35. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623–24. 
 36. Id. at 624. 
 37. LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 11.5. 
 38. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 624 (quotations omitted). 
 39. Haddad, supra note 30, at 420. 
 40. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
 41. Id. at 26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 42. Haddad, supra note 30, at 420. 
 43. 357 U.S. 214 (1958). 
 44. Id. at 216 (Harlan, J. & Whittaker. J., dissenting).  
6
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Five years later, in Pickelsimer v. Wainwright,45 Justice Harlan 
once again voiced his discontent with automatic retroactivity.46  In a 
brief, two-sentence per curiam opinion, the Pickelsimer Court 
remanded ten Florida cases for reconsideration in light of Gideon v. 
Wainwright.47  Dissatisfied with the Court’s “summary disposition” of 
ten Florida cases, Justice Harlan urged the Court to “deal 
definitively with th[e] important and far-reaching subject” of 
retroactivity.48  As these examples demonstrate, by 1965, 
Blackstone’s legal principles, the driving force behind American 
retroactivity jurisprudence, were under attack by supporters of 
Austin’s legal realism.49
2. Automatic Retroactivity Abandoned: Linkletter v. Walker 
  
In the 1965 decision of Linkletter v. Walker,50 the U.S. Supreme 
Court “expressly [addressed] the issue of retroactivity for the first 
time.”51  As Justice Clark explained in the first paragraph of the 
Court’s opinion, the Court granted certiorari to resolve “what has 
become a most troublesome question in the administration of 
justice.”52  The issue in Linkletter was whether the exclusionary rule 
announced in the landmark decision of Mapp v. Ohio53 applied 
retroactively to cases finally decided prior to Mapp.54  As the Court 
noted, “A split of authority ha[d] developed in the various courts of 
appeals concerning the retrospectivity of Mapp.”55
 
 45. 375 U.S. 2 (1963). 
  Citing a long 
 46. Id. at 3 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. at 2–3.      
 48. Id. at 3–4 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  “[I]t seems to me that the question 
whether the States are constitutionally required to apply the new rule 
retrospectively, which may well require the reopening of cases long since finally 
adjudicated . . . is one that should be decided only after informed and deliberate 
consideration.”  Id. at 3.  “Surely no general answer is to be found in ‘the fiction 
that the law now announced has always been the law.’”  Id. (quoting Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 49. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623–24 (1965).  By 1965, Austin’s 
theory of legal realism had also been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court and a 
number of state courts.  Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique 
and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (1975) (discussing growing judicial 
support of Austin’s legal realism). 
 50. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 618. 
 51. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1036 (2008). 
 52. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 620. 
 53. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  Mapp held that the exclusionary rule was binding 
on state courts as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.  Id. at 655. 
 54. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 619-20. 
 55. Id. at 620 n.2. 
7
Leyderman: Criminal Law: Minnesota Formally Adopts the Teague Retroactivity
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
12. Leyderman.doc 12/2/2009  4:46 PM 
304 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1 
list of conflicting cases, the Court stated that, “About the only point 
upon which there was agreement in the cases cited was that our 
opinion in Mapp did not foreclose the question” of retroactivity of 
Mapp.56
The “prospect of upsetting ‘thousands’ of final state court 
convictions in order to apply the exclusionary rule was too much,” 
forcing the Linkletter court to abandon “centuries of adherence to a 
strict rule of retroactivity.”
  
57  Ensuring that Mapp would not apply 
retroactively,58 Linkletter held that the retroactivity of new rules of 
constitutional criminal procedure should be determined on a case-
by-case basis under a three-part test.59  As the Court explained, the 
retroactivity of new rules would be determined by weighing “the 
merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of 
the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether 
retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.”60  
Thus, Linkletter abandoned the historic rule of automatic 
retroactivity61 and adopted the modern doctrine of 
“prospectivity.”62  In other words, new rules of constitutional 
criminal procedure would no longer enjoy automatic retroactive 
effect.63
The Linkletter decision was immediately criticized for its 
practical and theoretic shortcomings.
 
64
 
 56. Id. 
  The first attack came from 
 57. Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or “Redressability,” 
After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New 
Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1, 11 (2009) (discussing the Linkletter decision). 
 58. Id. at 12.  If applied retroactively, Mapp would overburden state criminal 
justice systems: “Hearings would have to be held in large numbers.  Guilty men 
would go free either because the States did not have the resources to carry the 
defense against claims of unlawful seizures to a successful conclusion or because 
essential evidence had been unlawfully seized and offered at trial.” Haddad, supra 
note 30, at 422 (discussing the Mapp decision).  
 59. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Lasch, supra note 57, at 11. 
 62. Leslie Capace Auberger, Note, Blakely v. Washington and the Retroactivity 
Question, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 655, 662 (2006). “It . . . appears that the prospective-only 
technique . . . is a permanent fixture . . . .” Haddad, supra note 30, at 419. 
 63. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629. 
 64. See Lasch, supra note 57, at 12–24 (discussing various critiques of the 
Linkletter decision).  “[C]ommentators have ‘had a veritable field day’ with the 
Linkletter standard, with much of the discussion being ‘more than mildly 
negative.’”  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 303 (1989) (citing Beytagh, supra note 
49, at 1558) (quotations omitted). 
8
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Justice Black, the author of the dissenting opinion in Linkletter.65  
Justice Black argued that the Mapp rule should be applied 
retroactively to Linkletter and others similarly situated while they 
are “languishing in jail” as a result of evidence used 
unconstitutionally to convict them.66  Justice Black began his 
critique of the Court’s decision by pointing out that, even though 
Linkletter’s offense was committed after that of Mapp, Linkletter’s 
conviction was affirmed while Mapp was set free.67  Dissatisfied with 
such a result, dictated only by the difference in timing between the 
two cases,68 Justice Black proclaimed that the Court’s decision in 
Linkletter was “arbitrary and discriminatory.”69
In addition to his dissatisfaction with the Court’s disparate 
treatment of similarly situated defendants, Justice Black was also 
concerned that the Linkletter court was pushing its constitutional 
limits by venturing into the sphere of legislative lawmaking.
   
70  As 
Justice Black explained, by announcing prospective-only rules of 
constitutional criminal procedure, the Court was making law rather 
than interpreting it.71  The criticism of the Court’s decision in 
Linkletter decision did not end with Justice Black’s dissent.72
Professor Mishkin, an often-cited commentator in the field, 
criticized Linkletter for abandoning Blackstonian theoretic 
principles.
 
73
 
 65. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 640 (Black, J., dissenting).  Justice Black was also 
joined in his dissent by Justice Douglas.  Id. 
  Mishkin believed that Blackstone’s declaratory theory 
 66. Id. at 645 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 67. See id. at 641. Mapp committed her offense on May 23, 1957; Linkletter 
committed his offense more than a year later, on August 16, 1958. Id. Mapp’s 
conviction became final on March 23, 1960, almost three years after her offense 
was committed; Linkletter’s conviction became final on March 21, 1960, about 
one year and seven months after his offense was committed. Id. 
 68. Justice Black criticized the Court for “perpetrat[ing] a grossly invidious 
and unfair discrimination against Linkletter simply because he happened to be 
prosecuted in a State that was evidently well up with its criminal court docket.”  Id. 
at 642.  As Justice Black explained, Linkletter’s conviction became final prior to 
the decision in Mapp simply because Louisiana’s appellate procedure was faster 
than that of Ohio.  Id. at 641.  Had Louisiana’s appellate procedure been slower, 
or Ohio’s faster, Linkletter’s conviction would not be “final” prior to Mapp, and 
Linkletter would be afforded the benefit of the exclusionary rule on direct review.  
Id.  “The Court offers no defense based on any known principle of justice for 
discriminating among defendants who were similarly convicted by use of evidence 
unconstitutionally seized.”  Id. 
 69. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965). 
 70. Id. at 644. 
 71. Id.  
 72. See infra notes 75–97 and accompanying text. 
 73. Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process 
9
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played a “symbolic role” in American jurisprudence and was 
necessary to uphold the “prestige and power” of American courts.74  
Mishkin also argued that the Linkletter decision would not only 
discourage attorneys from advocating on behalf of their clients by 
presenting novel legal theories, but would also interfere with the 
courts’ abilities to replace “unsound or outmoded legal 
doctrines.”75
Professor Haddad, another legal scholar, also attacked the 
Court’s decision in Linkletter, arguing that the Linkletter retroactivity 
approach should be abandoned.
  
76  Haddad criticized the Court for 
applying the new retroactivity approach to the rule announced in 
Mapp but not to those announced in Gideon and Griffin.77  Haddad 
especially criticized the Linkletter majority for its lack of and misuse 
of precedent.78  As Haddad explained, there were multiple cases 
decided prior to Linkletter where the Court applied new 
constitutional rights retroactively.79
 
of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 65 (1965) (discussing Linkletter’s 
abandonment of Blackstone’s declaratory theory of law). 
  Additionally, there were 
multiple instances where the Court invoked the common law 
automatic retroactivity doctrine to cases finally decided prior to the 
 74. Id. at 62–63 (discussing the symbolic significance of Blackstone’s theory 
of law).  “[T]he ‘declaratory theory’ expresses a symbolic concept of the judicial 
process on which much of courts’ prestige and power depend.”  Id. at 62.  “This is 
the strongly held and deeply felt belief that judges are bound by a body of fixed, 
overriding law, that they apply that law impersonally as well as impartially, that 
they exercise no individual choice and have no program of their own to advance.”  
Id.  “If the view be in part myth, it is a myth by which we live and which can be 
sacrificed only at substantial cost.”  Id. at 62–63.  While professor Mishkin 
criticized the Court’s rejection of Blackstone’s declaratory theory of law, he 
nonetheless agreed with the ultimate result reached by the Court in Linkletter.  Id. 
at 102 (“The Linkletter result . . . seems quite sound--indeed, in part for reasons 
which its rationale tends to obscure.”). 
 75. Id. at 60–61 (discussing the effects of prospective judicial lawmaking).  
“When a new rule of law is given purely prospective effect, it . . . does not 
determine the judgment awarded in the case in which it is announced. It follows 
that if parties anticipate such a prospective limitation, they will have no stimulus to 
argue for change in the law.”   
Id.  “[T]he recognition of even a substantial possibility of such limitation will tend 
to deter counsel from advancing contentions involving novelty or ingenuity and 
will lead them to focus on other aspects of their cases.”  Id. at 61. 
 76. Haddad, supra note 30, at 440–41 (concluding that prospective-only 
application of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure should be 
“banished”). 
 77. Haddad, supra note 30, at 423.  
 78. Haddad, supra note 30, at 425. 
 79. Id. 
10
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announcement of the new rule.80  Lastly, like Justice Black, Haddad 
was also dissatisfied with the Court’s disparate treatment of 
similarly situated defendants.81  For these and other reasons, 
Haddad concluded that the Linkletter retroactivity approach 
“should be banished.”82
Unpersuaded by the sharp criticism, the U.S. Supreme Court 
continued to expand the Linkletter rule in Johnson v. New Jersey
 
83 and 
Stovall v. Denno.84  In Johnson, the Court held that the rules 
announced in Escobedo v. Illinois85 and Miranda v. Arizona86 would 
not be applied retroactively.87  In Stovall, the Court held that the 
Linkletter rule would apply not only to cases on collateral review but 
also to cases pending on direct review.88  Thus, the Court continued 
to apply and expand the Linkletter rule in other important criminal 
procedure decisions throughout the 1960s.89
As the Court noted in Danforth, “application of the Linkletter 
standard produced strikingly divergent results.”
 
90  A few years after 
the Court’s decision in Stovall, Justice Harlan responded to these 
inconsistencies and attacked the Linkletter approach through his 
dissenting opinion in Desist v. United States91 and concurring 
opinion in Mackey v. United States.92
 
 80. Id. 
  Justice Harlan argued that in a 
short period of time, the Linkletter approach generated a large 
Many of these decisions represented conscious rejections of suggestions 
that a prospective-only doctrine be recognized in the area of 
constitutional criminal procedure.  The fact that such suggestions were 
not deemed worthy of comment by any majority opinion weighs heavily 
against a suggestion that the Court believed that prospective-only 
treatment could be accorded some constitutionally required procedural 
safeguards but not the one involved in the particular case before the 
Court. 
Id. 
 81. Id. at 438 (“There is something offensive about the notion that the 
Supreme Court of the United States, like the sometimes-just, sometimes-generous 
vineyard owner, can bestow its favors upon whomever it pleases.”).  
 82. Id. at 441. 
 83. 384 U.S. 719 (1966). 
 84. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
 85. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
 86. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 87. Johnson, 384 U.S. at 721. 
 88. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 300–01. 
 89. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1037 n.8 (2008). 
 90. Id. at 1037. 
 91. 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 92. 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
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number of “incompatible rules and inconsistent principles.”93  
Justice Harlan further proclaimed that the Linkletter approach had 
created “doctrinal confusion” and “must be rethought.”94  Despite 
the criticism, the Court continued to apply the Linkletter 
retroactivity approach for another twenty years.95
3. Retroactivity “Rethought”: Griffith v. Kentucky and Teague v. 
Lane 
 
In the 1987 decision of Griffith v. Kentucky,96 the Court finally 
started to “rethink” the Linkletter approach, as was urged by Justice 
Harlan in Desist and Mackey.97  Griffith rejected the Linkletter 
retroactivity rule for cases on direct review and held that new rules 
of constitutional criminal procedure would apply retroactively to all 
cases pending on direct review or not yet final.98
Two years later, in Teague v. Lane,
  
99 the Court reaffirmed 
Griffith and completely rejected the Linkletter approach to 
retroactivity.100  Under Teague, new rules101 of constitutional 
criminal procedure would not apply retroactively to cases on 
collateral review unless the case falls under one of two exceptions: 
(1) when the new rule places certain kinds of conduct “beyond the 
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe . . . .” and 
(2) when the new rule is a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure 
without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction would 
seriously be diminished.102
 
 93. Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
  As such, Teague established a new 
standard for determining whether new rules of constitutional 
criminal procedure apply retroactively. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Bosse, supra note 28, at 31. 
 96. 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
 97. 401 U.S. at 676–77 (Harlan, J., concurring); 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
 98. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328. 
 99. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 100. Id. at 311–13. Although Teague was a plurality opinion, it was quickly 
adopted by the majority of the Court in Penry v. Lynbaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 305 
(1989). 
 101. A “new rule” is one that “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation 
on the States or the Federal Government.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. In other words, 
“a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at 
the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id. 
 102. Id. at 311–12. 
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss1/6
12. Leyderman.doc 12/2/2009  4:46 PM 
2009] DANFORTH V. STATE 309 
4. The Court’s Final Word: Danforth v. Minnesota 
The latest development in the retroactivity jurisprudence was 
Danforth v. Minnesota, where the Court was asked to determine 
whether Teague is binding on state courts in post-conviction 
proceedings.103  As the Court noted, neither Linkletter nor Teague 
constricted the states from developing and adopting a broader 
retroactivity approach for state post-conviction proceedings.104  
Furthermore, Teague was not developed to further state goals, but 
rather to address the goals of federal habeas review and minimize 
federal interference in state criminal convictions.105  As Danforth 
concluded, Teague “does not in any way limit the authority of a state 
court, when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide 
a remedy for a violation that is deemed ‘nonretroactive’ under 
Teague.”106  Thus, states are now free to develop their own approach 
for determining the retroactivity of new rules of constitutional 
criminal procedure.107
B. Development and History of Minnesota’s Retroactivity Doctrine 
 
In Danforth v. State, the Minnesota Supreme Court provided a 
brief overview of the history and development of Minnesota’s 
retroactivity doctrine.108  There, the supreme court traced 
Minnesota’s retroactivity jurisprudence to its 1977 decision of State 
v. Olsen.109
 
 103. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008).  Although a majority of 
states did not interpret Teague as binding on state courts, three states, Minnesota, 
Oregon, and Montana, were under the impression that Teague was binding on 
state courts.  Id. at 1042 n.17. 
  However, an even earlier Minnesota case discussing the 
retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure in 
 104. Id. at 1038.  “A close reading of the Teague opinion makes clear that the 
rule it established was tailored to the unique context of federal habeas and 
therefore had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in their 
own postconviction proceedings than required by that opinion.”  Id. at 1039.  The 
Court also noted that because Teague was a statutory decision interpreting a 
federal statute, it cannot be read as binding on state courts.  Id. at 1040. 
 105. Id. at 1041. 
 106. Id. at 1042. 
 107. Lasch, supra note 57, at 43.  As the Court noted in Danforth, the majority 
of states have recognized that Teague was not binding on state postconviction 
proceedings.  128 S. Ct. at 1042.  However, most states continue to apply the 
Teague approach “out of convenience.”  Lasch, supra note 57, at 42. 
 108. 761 N.W.2d 493, 495–97 (Minn. 2009). 
 109. Id. at 496 (referring to State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898, 907 n.15 (Minn. 
1977)). 
13
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some detail is the court’s 1965 decision of State v. Richter.110
The issue before the court in Richter was whether Mapp, 
decided in 1961, applied retroactively to a 1951 conviction 
obtained through a guilty plea.
  
111  Anticipating the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision on the retroactivity of Mapp,112 the Richter court 
appeared hesitant to issue an opinion on the matter.113  
Nonetheless, the court provided a thorough analysis, expressly 
rejecting Blackstone’s declaratory theory of law and stating that the 
retroactivity of Mapp would be decided based on public policy 
considerations.114  As the court explained, “we do not subscribe to 
the philosophy that Mapp was the law in 1951.”115  The Richter court 
also distinguished Mapp from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Griffin and Gideon, explaining that the new rules announced in 
those cases are applied retroactively because they have a direct 
impact on the reliability of a defendant’s trial and on the 
determination of his innocence or guilt.116
The exclusionary rule announced in Mapp, on the other hand, 
does not affect the reliability of the defendant’s trial and was 
designed primarily for the purpose of deterring police 
misconduct.
   
117  Writing that retroactive application of Mapp would 
disturb a reliably obtained conviction and have no deterrent effect 
on police misconduct, the Richter court concluded that Mapp would 
not be applied retroactively in that case.118
 
 110. 270 Minn. 307, 133 N.W.2d 537 (1965). 
 
 111. Id. at 307–08, 133 N.W.2d at 537–38. 
 112. Id. at 310, 133 N.W.2d at 539.  Decided in February of 1965, the Richter 
court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Linkletter v. 
Walker.  Id. at 310, 133 N.W.2d at 539.  The Court decided Linkletter v. Walker less 
than four months later, in June of 1965. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).  
 113. Richter, 270 Minn. at 310, 133 N.W.2d at 539 (“So much has been written 
on the retroactivity of Mapp we hesitate to further burden the bench and bar with 
protracted speculation on how that question will ultimately be resolved.”).  The 
court nonetheless went on to provide a detailed, in-depth analysis of the 
retroactivity of Mapp.  See id. at 311–17, 133 N.W.2d at 540–43. 
 114. Id. at 312–13, 133 N.W.2d at 540–41.  “[W]e do not feel compelled to 
adopt the views expressed by Blackstone in his Commentaries concerning the 
effect of overruling previous decisions. . . . [T]he application of the Mapp rule 
must be determined by a consideration of broad public policy.”  Id. at 312–13, 133 
N.W.2d at 540–41. 
 115. Id. at 313, 133 N.W.2d at 541. 
 116. Id. at 315, 133 N.W.2d at 542. 
 117. Id. at 316, 133 N.W.2d at 542. 
 118. Id. at 316–17, 133 N.W.2d at 542–43.  “[W]e do not feel moved to adopt a 
rule which can not now have any deterrent effect, but would result only in 
granting a belated trial to a prisoner who has confessed in open court the details 
14
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During the period immediately following the Court’s decision 
in Linkletter, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure a few 
times, although only summarily in a number of cases.119  In State ex 
rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, the court addressed the retroactivity of 
Escobedo v. Illinois in some detail.120  Relying, among other cases, on 
Linkletter and Richter, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that 
Escobedo would not apply retroactively unless directed otherwise by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.121  As in Richter, the court based its 
decision on the determination that Escobedo, unlike Gideon and 
Griffin, does not play a role on the reliability of the defendant’s 
conviction and, as such, should not be applied retroactively.122  In 
Bultman v. State123 and State ex rel. Boswell v. Tahash,124
While Linkletter was cited by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
numerous decisions,
 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court decided that, based on Linkletter, Mapp would not 
be given retroactive effect. 
125 the court did not formally adopt the 
Linkletter retroactivity standard until its State v. Hamm decision in 
1988.126  In Hamm, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the 
Minnesota Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a twelve-
person jury in misdemeanor prosecutions and struck down a 
fifteen-year-old statute, providing for a six-person jury, as 
unconstitutional.127  Next, citing State v. Olsen,128 the court formally 
adopted the Linkletter-Stovall retroactivity standard and held that 
the new twelve-person jury rule would not apply retroactively.129
 
of the offense with which he was charged.”  Id. at 316, 133 N.W.2d at 543. 
  
 119. See Bultman v. State, 290 Minn. 511, 513, 187 N.W.2d 117, 118 (1971) 
(disposing of the retroactivity issue in one short paragraph); State ex rel. Boswell v. 
Tahash, 278 Minn. 408, 417, 154 N.W.2d 813, 819 (1967) (disposing of the 
retroactivity issue in one short paragraph). 
 120. 272 Minn. 539, 141 N.W.2d 3 (1966). 
 121. Id. at 546–47, 141 N.W.2d at 9. 
 122. Id. at 545–46, 141 N.W.2d at 8–9. 
 123. 290 Minn. 511, 513, 187 N.W.2d 117, 118 (1971). 
 124. 278 Minn. 408, 417, 154 N.W.2d 813, 819 (1967). 
 125. See supra notes 114–27 and accompanying text. 
 126. 423 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1988). 
 127. Id. at 386. 
 128. 258 N.W.2d 898, 907 n.15 (Minn. 1977). 
 129. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d at 386.  The court stated: “In . . . Olsen . . . we cited 
with approval various United States Supreme Court cases which set forth a test for 
determining whether a decision should be applied prospectively.  We adopt the 
criteria set forth in those cases and hold that the criteria have been met in this 
case.”  Id. 
15
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Under the Linkletter-Stovall approach, courts would decide the 
retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure by 
considering three factors: “(1) the purpose of the decision, (2) 
reliance on the prior rule of law, and (3) the effect upon the 
administration of justice of granting retroactive effect.”130
As the court noted in Danforth, Minnesota courts continued to 
follow the Linkletter-Stovall retroactivity approach until 2004.
 
131  That 
year, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued its decision in O’Meara 
v. State,132 where the court abandoned the Linkletter-Stovall 
retroactivity approach and adopted the Teague retroactivity 
approach in its place.133  The O’Meara court explained that it was 
“compelled to follow the lead of the Supreme Court in 
determining” the retroactivity of new rules of federal constitutional 
criminal procedure.134  Finally, in its most recent decision of 
Danforth v. State, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s invitation to abandon Teague and instead formally 
adopted the Teague retroactivity standard for state post-conviction 
proceedings.135
III. THE DANFORTH DECISION 
  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s final decision in 
Danforth is described in detail below. 
In the summer of 1995, Stephen Danforth was charged with 
first-degree criminal sexual conduct for allegedly molesting J.S., a 
six-year-old boy.136  During a videotaped interview, J.S. stated that 
he was sexually abused by Danforth.137  The videotape of the 
interview was admitted into evidence, and the jury was allowed to 
watch the videotape at trial.138  Danforth was subsequently found 
guilty,139 and his conviction was affirmed on appeal.140
 
 130. Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 2009). 
  
 131. Id. at 496. 
 132. 679 N.W.2d 334 (Minn. 2004). 
 133. Id. at 339–40. 
 134. Id. at 339. 
 135. Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 500. 
 136. State v. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).  At the 
time, Danforth was a convicted pedophile and a disbarred attorney.  Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 495. 
 139. Danforth, 573 N.W.2d at 372.  Danforth was originally sentenced to 216 
months imprisonment.  Id. 
 140. Id. at 378.  However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals remanded the case 
for resentencing, and Danforth’s sentence was increased to 316 months 
imprisonment on remand.  Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 454 (Minn. 2006), 
16
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In 2004, eight years after Danforth’s conviction, the U.S. 
Supreme Court issued its decisions in Crawford v. Washington141 and 
Blakely v. Washington.142  Following these holdings, Danforth filed a 
post-conviction petition, seeking relief under the new rules 
established therein.143  Danforth’s petition was denied because, as 
the court found, Crawford and Blakely did not apply retroactively to 
Danforth’s case.144  The court of appeals affirmed, and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court granted review solely on the Crawford 
issue.145
On review, Danforth argued that the supreme court is free to 
apply a retroactivity standard broader than Teague, and that 
Crawford applies to his case under state retroactivity principles.
 
146  
Danforth also argued that Crawford applies to his case even under 
the Teague retroactivity standard.147  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
rejected Danforth’s arguments, holding that (1) it was required to 
follow the Teague retroactivity standard, and (2) Crawford did not 
apply to Danforth’s case retroactively under Teague.148  Danforth 
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and 
reversed and remanded.  The Court held that state courts are not 
required to follow Teague and may develop their own standards for 
determining the retroactivity of new rules of federal constitutional 
criminal procedure.149  Danforth’s case then returned to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.150
On remand, Danforth argued that the Teague standard should 
be abandoned, and that the Minnesota Supreme Court should 
return to the Linkletter-Stovall
  
151
 
cert. granted in part, 550 U.S. 956 (2007), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008).  
 approach or adopt Nevada’s 
 141. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  Crawford held that, under the Confrontation Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution, out-of-court testimonial statements made by a witness must 
be excluded from evidence unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant 
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.  Id. at 59.  
 142. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).  Blakely held that an upward departure from a 
statutory maximum sentence, based on findings made by a judge rather than a 
jury, is unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  Id. 
at 301–05. 
 143. Danforth, 718 N.W.2d at 455. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1046 (2008). 
 150. Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493 (Minn. 2009). 
 151. See supra notes 131–133 and accompanying text. 
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Colwell152 approach for deciding whether new rules of federal 
constitutional criminal procedure apply retroactively.153  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court framed the issue on remand as “what 
standard [it] should use to decide whether new rules of federal 
constitutional criminal procedure will be applied retroactively.”154  
The Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately rejected Danforth’s 
arguments and affirmed its prior decision, holding that Minnesota 
will continue to use the Teague standard for deciding whether new 
rules of constitutional criminal procedure apply retroactively to 
state criminal convictions.155
After reviewing the changes in Minnesota’s retroactivity 
doctrine over the last half of the twentieth century,
  
156 the supreme 
court considered the policy concerns underlying Teague.157  The 
Danforth court first admitted that not all policy considerations 
leading to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Teague necessarily 
transfer to state courts addressing state post-conviction 
challenges.158  As such, the Danforth court conceded that Teague’s 
concerns of interfering with state convictions do not play a role in 
state post-conviction proceedings.159  However, the Danforth court 
stated that Teague’s second policy consideration, finality of state 
convictions, is equally applicable to state post-conviction 
proceedings.160  Quoting Teague, the court highlighted the 
importance of finality of state convictions: “Without finality, the 
criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”161
 
 152. Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 471 (Nev. 2002).  Colwell is a modified 
version of the Teague retroactivity standard, which broadened Teague’s first 
exception and eliminated the “watershed” rule requirement from Teague’s second 
exception.  Id. at 472.  
  The 
 153. Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 498. 
 154. Id. at 495. 
 155. Id. at 500.  
 156. Id. at 495–96.  The supreme court explained that until recently, 
Minnesota followed the Linkletter-Stovall standard set out by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Id. at 495.  In 2004, however, Minnesota abandoned Linkletter and adopted 
the standard set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Teague.  Id. at 496.  Since that 
time, Minnesota has consistently followed the Teague retroactivity standard.  Id. at 
496–97. 
 157. Id. at 497–98. 
 158. See id. at 498 (“[W]e acknowledge that one of the policy concerns 
underlying Teague-that federal habeas courts not excessively interfere with state 
courts-is absent when a state court is reviewing state convictions”). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.  The Danforth court also noted that other states have recognized an 
interest in finality of state convictions.  Id. 
 161. Id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989)).  The court also 
18
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court further explained that the Teague standard not only supports 
Minnesota’s interest in finality of criminal convictions, but is also a 
“bright line rule.”162
Finally, the supreme court explained its reasoning for rejecting 
Danforth’s invitation to adopt an alternative retroactivity 
approach.
 
163  The court first considered and rejected a return to 
the Linkletter-Stovall test.164  The court explained that a return to 
Linkletter-Stovall would overburden Minnesota’s criminal justice 
system with re-litigation of old cases under new rules.165  The court 
also rejected Nevada’s Colwell standard advocated by Danforth 
because Colwell, according to the court, would lead to the same 
finality problems as those created by Linkletter-Stovall.166  The court 
concluded by stating that cases announcing new rules under Teague 
are rare not because Teague is “unyielding or unworkable,” but 
because “such cases are rare.”167  Thus, in Danforth, Minnesota 
formally adopted the Teague retroactivity standard for state post-
conviction proceedings.168
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DANFORTH DECISION 
 
A. Minnesota Should “Rethink” its Retroactivity Approach 
As the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized in Danforth, Teague was 
not intended to limit states’ authority to grant relief in state post-
conviction proceedings.169
 
relied on the Florida Supreme Court’s reasoning that “an absence of finality casts 
a cloud of tentativeness over the criminal justice system, benefiting neither the 
person convicted nor society as a whole.”  Id. at 498–99 (quoting Witt v. State, 387 
So.2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980)). 
  Rather, the purpose of Teague was to 
 162. Id. at 499.  But see Lasch, supra note 57, at 50–51 (suggesting that Teague 
may work against finality by giving defendants an incentive to prolong their direct 
appeal as long as possible in hopes that a beneficial new rule will be announced 
before their conviction becomes final); see also Strauss, supra note 32, at 1222 
(stating that the U.S. Supreme Court’s current retroactivity doctrine is 
“incoherent” and “difficult to apply”). 
 163. Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 499. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.  The court also noted that no other state has followed Nevada’s Colwell 
approach.  Id. 
 167. Id. at 500.  The court appeared to agree that Teague is a strict rule, but 
nonetheless believed that “eventually there may be a new rule” that will apply 
retroactively under Teague.  Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2008). 
19
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address the goals of federal habeas review and minimize federal 
interference with state criminal convictions.170  Thus, Teague has 
“no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in their 
own post-conviction proceedings than required by that opinion.”171
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed that federal habeas 
concerns are irrelevant for the purposes of state post-conviction 
proceedings.
  
172  However, the court refused to abandon Teague due 
to its concern for finality and fear of a major disruption in the state 
criminal justice system.173  While the court’s reasoning adequately 
addresses the State’s interest in finality, it completely neglects 
another important state interest—to correct “miscarriages of 
justice.”174
One purpose of state post-conviction proceedings, which is 
nonexistent in federal habeas review, is to provide an “initial 
forum” for raising and litigating various constitutional violations.
  
175  
It is during state post-conviction proceedings—not federal habeas 
review—that issues of innocence and fairness of proceedings are 
initially litigated.176  By focusing solely on finality, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court ignored the “liberty-ensuring” function of state 
post-conviction review.177  In other words, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court failed to “weigh the importance” of finality against other 
state interests, such as fairness and accuracy of convictions, as was 
suggested by the U.S. Supreme Court in Danforth.178
 
 170. Id. 
  To ensure that 
Minnesota’s retroactivity doctrine serves the needs of Minnesota’s 
post-conviction review, the Minnesota Supreme Court should adopt 
a less stringent test than Teague, one that will allow the goals of state 
 171. Id. at 1039. 
 172. Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 498.  “[W]e acknowledge that one of the policy 
concerns underlying Teague–that federal habeas courts not excessively interfere 
with state courts–is absent when a state court is reviewing state convictions . . . .” 
Id. 
 173. Id. at 498–500.  Although the court expressed great concern for the 
possibility of never-ending litigation under Linkletter, it failed to provide a single 
example of any such major disruptions during the twenty-seven years that Linkletter 
was in force in Minnesota.  See id. at 495–96.  
 174. Hutton, supra note 1, at 444 (discussing state postconviction remedies). 
 175. Lasch, supra note 57, at 44 (discussing state postconviction remedies). 
 176. See Hutton, supra note 1, at 441 (discussing state postconviction 
remedies). 
 177. See id. “For the states to parrot the federal courts’ focus on finality and 
waste of resources as reasons not to afford careful scrutiny in the postconviction 
setting is incongruous.” Id. at 443 (footnotes omitted). 
 178. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2008). 
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post-conviction review to be accomplished.179
B. Review of Alternatives to Teague 
 
Having determined that Teague is too restrictive for state post-
conviction proceedings, the next question is what retroactivity test 
the Minnesota Supreme Court should adopt in its place.180  One of 
the easiest options is to simply return to the pre-Linkletter, common 
law approach of automatic retroactivity.181
In 1969, only four years after the Court’s decision in Linkletter, 
Professor Haddad urged the Court to abandon Linkletter and return 
to the common law approach of automatic retroactivity.
   
182  Haddad 
argued that Linkletter was incorrectly decided, departed from 
precedent, and discriminated between similarly situated 
defendants.183  Because Haddad was responding to the Court’s 
decision in Linkletter, his argument was only targeted at the U.S. 
Supreme Court, not state courts addressing state post-conviction 
challenges.184  However, judging by his concluding remarks, it 
appears that Professor Haddad believed that prospective-only 
application of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure 
should never have been an option anywhere in the country.185  
Professor Haddad’s suggestion to return to the common law 
approach of automatic retroactivity has recently been renewed, but 
aims specifically at state courts in state post-conviction 
proceedings.186
In his detailed analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Danforth, Professor Lasch urges state courts to adopt the standard 
of automatic retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal 
procedure.
 
187
 
 179. See Hutton, supra note 1, at 457 (discussing states’ reaction to Teague). 
  In his article, Lasch argues that unlike the Teague 
approach, full retroactivity of new rules offers several benefits for 
 180. See id. at 451. 
 181. See id. at 440–41. 
 182. Id.  Although Haddad published his article twenty years prior to the 
Court’s decision in Teague, his proposal to return to the common law approach of 
automatic retroactivity is still an available option today. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. at 441 (“‘Non-retroactivity’ should be banished from the 
constitutional criminal procedure scene.”).  
 186. See infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text. 
 187. Lasch, supra note 57, at 43 (“Among the various options [of retroactivity 
standards] from which state courts may choose, full retroactivity is far and away the 
best choice . . . .”). 
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the states.188  For example, Lasch points out that certain claims, 
such as “ineffective assistance of counsel” and government’s failure 
to share exculpatory evidence, are almost always litigated on post-
conviction review rather than on direct review.189  By adopting the 
Teague retroactivity standard, state courts forego an opportunity to 
participate in the doctrinal development of certain constitutional 
claims, and, as a result, leave the U.S. Supreme Court as the sole 
authority for the development of this area of the law.190  By 
returning to full retroactivity, on the other hand, state courts would 
not only play a direct role in the development of post-conviction 
remedies, but also advocate for and protect state interests by 
influencing the development of federal constitutional law.191
Additionally, Professor Lasch argues that a return to full 
retroactivity would eliminate the problem of inequality, which 
Teague addressed but did not fully resolve.
  
192  As Lasch explains, the 
Teague retroactivity doctrine still discriminates between defendants 
whose cases are on direct review and those whose cases are on 
collateral review.193  For example, two codefendants convicted on 
the same day may be treated differently under Teague simply 
because one codefendant happened to finalize his direct review 
process faster than the other.194  Lasch concludes that states can 
easily avoid such “accidents of time” by abandoning Teague and 
returning to full retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal 
procedure.195  Thus, as demonstrated above, one option available 
for the Minnesota Supreme Court to consider is a return to the 
common law approach of automatic retroactivity.196
Writing four years after the Court’s decision in Teague, 
 
 
 188. See infra notes 193–99 and accompanying text. 
 189. Lasch, supra note 57, at 51. 
 190. Id. at 52. 
 191. Id. at 52–53. 
 192. Id. at 48. 
 193. Id. at 48–49. 
 194. Id. at 49.  Lasch provides an even more striking hypothetical by 
comparing two codefendants, one of whom appeals his conviction based on a 
frivolous claim, while the other does not file an appeal at all.  Id. at 50–51.  If a 
new rule is announced after the conviction of the latter becomes final, but while 
the conviction of the former is still on direct appeal, only the defendant who 
abused the appellate process will benefit from the new rule.  Id.  Such a result 
conflicts with the states’ interest in finality of convictions by giving litigants an 
incentive to prolong their litigation in hopes that a new, favorable rule will be 
announced while their case is still on direct review.  See id.  
 195. Id. 
 196. See supra notes 183–198 and accompanying text.  
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Professor Hutton suggested two other alternatives, or retroactivity 
standards, that states may consider as replacements for Teague.197  
One of these alternatives is the return to the Linkletter-Stovall 
approach.198  Hutton admits that the Linkletter-Stovall approach 
leads to disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants.199  
Nonetheless, she argues that the Linkletter-Stovall retroactivity 
standard, unlike Teague, allows state courts to focus on protection 
and enforcement of constitutional rights, which is the purpose of 
state post-conviction proceedings.200
The second alternative proposed by Professor Hutton is a 
“pure prospectivity/retroactivity” approach.
 
201  Under this 
approach, new rules of constitutional criminal procedure would be 
applied either to all defendants challenging their convictions or to 
none at all.202  As Hutton explains, this approach has its risks and 
benefits.203  If new rules are applied retroactively to every defendant 
challenging his conviction, all defendants would be treated 
similarly, and the timing of a particular defendant’s appeal process 
would not dictate whether he should benefit from the new rule.204  
While pure retroactivity will eliminate the arbitrary discrimination 
between defendants,205 it carries the risk of disturbing the states’ 
criminal justice systems each time a new rule of constitutional 
criminal procedure is announced.206
Pure prospectivity, on the other hand, will dissuade defendants 
from challenging their convictions on constitutional grounds 
because, even if successful, they will not benefit from the new 
rule.
   
207  Additionally, prospective application of new rules is 
inconsistent with the purpose of state post-conviction review 
because it allows for continued incarceration of defendants whose 
convictions were based on constitutional violations.208
 
 197. Hutton, supra note 1, at 451–57. 
  Nonetheless, 
 198. Id. at 452–55. 
 199. Id. at 454. 
 200. Id. at 454. 
 201. Id. at 455–57. 
 202. Id. at 455. 
 203. Id. at 455–57. 
 204. Id. at 456.  This is also one of the arguments made by Justice Black in his 
dissenting opinion in Linkletter v. Walker.  381 U.S. 618, 642 (1965) (Black, J., 
dissenting); see also supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text. 
 205. See infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 206. Hutton, supra note 1, at 457. 
 207. Id. at 456. 
 208. Id. 
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the Linkletter-Stovall approach and the “pure 
prospectivity/retroactivity” approach are two more alternatives that 
the Minnesota Supreme Court may adopt to replace Teague. 
Another alternative to the Teague retroactivity standard was 
adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court in Colwell v. State.209  In 
Colwell, the Nevada Supreme Court considered whether it should 
adopt Teague or an alternative approach for determining the 
retroactivity of new rules of constitutional criminal procedure.210  
Unlike the Minnesota Supreme Court in Danforth,211 the Nevada 
Supreme Court concluded that Teague is not binding on Nevada 
courts in state post-conviction proceedings212 and ultimately 
rejected the strict application of Teague.213
In its analysis, the Colwell court reviewed the retroactivity 
approach set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Teague, observing 
that the Teague retroactivity rule is “sound in principle.”
  
214  
However, the Colwell court also emphasized that the policy 
considerations responsible for the Court’s decision in Teague, 
including finality of convictions, are only partially relevant to state 
courts’ task of addressing state post-conviction challenges.215  
Additionally, the Colwell court observed that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has applied Teague so narrowly that new rules of 
constitutional procedure are rarely applied on collateral review.216  
Having made these determinations, the Colwell court decided to 
retain Teague, but with significant modifications.217
These modifications involved broadening the scope of Teague’s 
two exceptions.
 
218
 
 209. 59 P.3d 463 (Nev. 2002). 
  As such, under Colwell, new rules of 
constitutional criminal procedure will apply retroactively if the case 
falls under one of the following two exceptions: “(1) if the rule 
 210. Id. at 469–72. 
 211. Danforth v. State, 718 N.W.2d 451, 454 (Minn. 2006). 
 212. The Colwell court explained that besides the minimum protections 
offered by the two exceptions in Teague, Teague is not binding on Nevada state 
courts.  Colwell, 59 P.3d at 470.  “[W]e are free to choose the degree of retroactivity 
or prospectivity which we believe appropriate to the particular rule under 
consideration, so long as we give federal constitutional rights at least as broad a 
scope as the United States Supreme Court requires.”  Id. at 471 (quoting State v. 
Fair, 502 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Or. 1972)) (quotations omitted). 
 213. Id. at 472. 
 214. Id. at 471. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 472. 
 218. Id. at 471–72. 
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establishes that it is unconstitutional to proscribe certain conduct 
as criminal or to impose a type of punishment on certain 
defendants because of their status or offense; or (2) if it establishes 
a procedure without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction 
is seriously diminished.”219  Colwell’s first exception is broader than 
Teague’s first exception in that it is not limited to cases involving 
“primary, private individual” conduct.220  Colwell’s second exception 
is also broader than Teague’s second exception in that it does not 
require the new rule to be of “watershed” significance.221  As such, 
Colwell’s second exception will allow retroactive application of a 
new rule if the new rule has a significant impact on the accuracy of 
a defendant’s trial and conviction.222  Having set out this modified 
version of Teague as Nevada’s new retroactivity doctrine, the Colwell 
court stated the new approach will be both “fair and 
straightforward.”223
As explained above, the Minnesota Supreme Court has a 
variety of alternatives that can be adopted in Teague’s place.
 
224  One 
option is to return to the common law approach of automatic 
retroactivity.225  Two other available approaches are the Linkletter-
Stovall standard or Hutton’s “pure prospectivity/retroactivity” 
approach.226  Finally, another available alternative is Colwell’s 
modified Teague standard.227  As  outlined below, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court should adopt Colwell’s modified Teague standard 
because it is responsive to both finality and accuracy of convictions, 
and, therefore, is a fair and balanced approach.228
C. Colwell’s Modified Version of Teague is the Best Alternative for 
Minnesota 
 
From the options available, Colwell’s modified Teague standard 
is the best approach for Minnesota because it would allow for an 
equal balance between Minnesota’s interest in finality of 
convictions on the one hand and fairness and accuracy of criminal 
 
 219. Id. at 472. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See supra notes 183–226 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra notes 183–200 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra notes 201–212 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra notes 213–227 and accompanying text. 
 228. See infra notes 233–240 and accompanying text. 
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proceedings on the other.  First, Colwell’s approach would address 
Minnesota’s interest in finality of state convictions229 and, if 
applied, would uphold the integrity of Minnesota’s criminal justice 
system.  As the Colwell court explained, the modified Teague 
approach incorporates Teague’s main rule that new rules of 
constitutional criminal procedure would generally not be applied 
retroactively in state post-conviction proceedings.230  As such, 
Colwell’s modified Teague rule would not cause any major 
disruptions in Minnesota’s criminal justice system, as was feared by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court majority in Danforth.231  Contrary to 
the Danforth court’s fears, new rules of constitutional criminal 
procedure would not necessarily be frequently announced, and, 
even when announced, would not necessarily be applied 
retroactively.232
Additionally, the modified Teague rule would not lead to 
inconsistent results, as was the case with Linkletter-Stovall, because 
the Minnesota Supreme Court could apply the modified Teague 
rule in a consistent manner and provide lower courts with guidance 
in a relatively short period of time.  Colwell’s modified version of 
Teague would be beneficial to Minnesota’s interest in finality of 
criminal convictions and would uphold the integrity of the state 
criminal justice system. 
   
In addition to addressing finality of convictions, Colwell’s 
modified Teague approach would also address and improve the 
fairness and accuracy of criminal proceedings in Minnesota.  
Colwell’s major modification of the original Teague rule is that it 
broadens the scope of Teague’s two exceptions.233  Most 
importantly, Colwell does away with the “watershed” rule 
requirement necessary for retroactive application under Teague.234
 
 229. Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. 2009) (stating that finality 
of convictions is an important state interest). 
  
The Colwell approach allows courts to simply determine whether a 
new rule has a significant impact on the accuracy and reliability of a 
trial rather than concerning themselves with whether the rule 
 230. Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 471–73 (2002) (adopting the general 
framework of Teague). 
 231. See Danforth, 761 N.W.2d at 501 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (stating that 
Colwell’s modified version of Teague would not have an adverse effect on the state 
criminal justice system). 
 232. See Colwell, 59 P.3d at 473 (finding that the rule in question in Colwell’s 
case was new, but would not be given retroactive effect).  
 233. Id. at 472. 
 234. Id.  
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qualifies as “watershed.”235  By focusing on accuracy, Minnesota 
courts would be addressing the fairness of trials and innocence of 
criminal defendants, and, as a result, be furthering the goals and 
purpose of Minnesota’s post-conviction review.236
V. CONCLUSION 
  Since Teague was 
not designed to further such state objectives, Minnesota’s current 
retroactivity doctrine does not adequately address these important 
state interests.  Because Colwell’s modified version of Teague allows 
for a healthy balance between the competing interests of finality 
and fairness, it is the best retroactivity approach for the State of 
Minnesota. 
The federal retroactivity doctrine has undergone some major 
changes during the last half of the twentieth century.  While the 
current federal retroactivity doctrine was designed specifically to 
address federal interests and applications, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has adopted the federal approach and, most recently, 
rejected the U.S. Supreme Court’s invitation to adopt an approach 
that best suits state goals and objectives.  In formally adopting the 
Teague retroactivity standard for state post-conviction proceedings, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court neglected to address the important 
state interests of fairness and accuracy of state criminal convictions.  
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s focus on finality and its decision 
to formally adopt Teague will most likely preclude retroactive 
application of new rules to most, if not all, cases on state post-
conviction review.237
 
 To create a healthy balance between the 
competing interests of fairness and finality of convictions, and to 
allow the goals of state post-conviction review to be accomplished, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court should rethink its retroactivity 
approach and replace Teague with a more balanced test that 
adequately addresses all of these important state interests.   
 
 235. See id. (“[I]f accuracy is seriously diminished without the rule, the rule is 
significant enough to warrant retroactive application.”). 
 236. See Hutton, supra note 1, at 441 (discussing state postconviction 
remedies). 
 237. See Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 500–02 (Minn. 2009) (Anderson, 
J., dissenting).  Justice Anderson acknowledged the criticism that “the Teague rule 
has been applied so strictly by the  U.S.  Supreme Court ‘that decisions defining a 
constitutional safeguard rarely merit application on collateral review.’”  Id. 
(quoting Colwell, 59 P.3d at 471). 
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